Ideas from 'Commentary on the Metaphysics' by Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) [1022], by Theme Structure

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence
                        Full Idea: Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence.
                        From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 1/6), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.91
                        A reaction: I think I might put it that wisdom is only really possible for people who aim to grasp being and essence in some way. I see no prospect of understanding 'being', and even essences may be forever just beyond our grasp.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
The simple's whatness is its very self
                        Full Idea: The simple's whatness is its very self.
                        From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 5.5), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.103
                        A reaction: Aquinas endorses this Aristotelian view in Idea 11208.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness
                        Full Idea: The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness.
                        From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 11/12.14), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)
                        A reaction: This remark is not invalidated by developments in modern particle physics.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars)
                        Full Idea: Avicenna's 'indifference of essence' says the essence of certain things can become universal or singular, according to whether it is entertained by the mind (as a universal) or concretely exemplified as a singular thing. One essence can exist in two ways.
                        From: report of Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Sources'
                        A reaction: This would appear to be a form of nominalism, since in the concrete external world we only have particulars, and it is our mode of thinking (by abstraction?) that generates the universal aspect. I think this is probably right.