Ideas from 'Essence and Accident' by Irving M. Copi [1954], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Journal of Philosophy' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties'
                        Full Idea: With respect to scientific usage, we can say that the real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties.
                        From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.718)
                        A reaction: Once again, Copi is a hero. I personally love the word 'powers' in metaphysics (and dislike the word 'properties', which is lost in a fog of confusion). See Molnar on 'powers' and Mumford on 'dispositions'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others
                        Full Idea: The 'explanatory characterization' says that the essential properties of an object are the object's deepest explanatory properties, which explain the other properties of the object - and which Copi claims is mind-independent.
                        From: report of Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2
                        A reaction: It is, of course, normal to see a good explanation as being dependent on the interests of the audience. Perhaps this account should be in terms of causal powers. See Shoemaker on properties.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence
                        Full Idea: In the sphere of scientific enquiry the distinction between real and nominal essence tends to disappear; the scientist's classification of things is intended to be in terms of their real essences.
                        From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.716)
                        A reaction: Thus we have disputes over what is the 'real' classification of natural kinds such as animals. There is not much point in a classification system that does not at least reflect some aspects of reality.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction
                        Full Idea: If we can distinguish the different kinds of change (alteration, locomotion, growth, diminution), then we can say that a given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object.
                        From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.707-8)
                        A reaction: As Copi is aware, this is a necessary condition for a property for essence, but not sufficient. If an attribute were necessary but non-essential, its loss would also be destruction. We say the essential attributes must also have some explanatory role.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them
                        Full Idea: Modern science seeks to know the real essences of things, and its increasing successes seem to be bringing it progressively nearer to that goal.
                        From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.715)
                        A reaction: This is from a notable pioneering paper, which outlined scientific essentialism even before Marcus and Kripke began to offer a modern account of essence to give it backing. Compare Popper, who thinks essences are will-o-the-wisps.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties
                        Full Idea: Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge.
                        From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717)
                        A reaction: Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals.