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| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us |
| Full Idea: For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4) | |||
| A reaction: I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end? |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) |
| Full Idea: For us, sets constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm. But for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1 n4) | |||
| A reaction: Genus and differentia are only part of the story in Aristotle, and this remarks strikes me as perceptive. It is precisely the mapping of the explanatory hierarchy which Aristotle seeks in a good definition. |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence |
| Full Idea: It may be that the two forms of grounding have a different source; the one from the bottom up is required for the constitution of the thing to be intelligible; the one from the top down is required for the essence of the thing to be intelligible. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 2) | |||
| A reaction: [He cites Aristotle Met. 1019a8-10 in support] Close reading of Fine would be needed to elucidate this properly, but it is a suggestive line of thought about how we should approach grounding. |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends |
| Full Idea: If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1) | |||
| A reaction: This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach. |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? |
| Full Idea: There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1) | |||
| A reaction: This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well. |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects |
| Full Idea: If one considers Aristotle's standard example of a definition, then it is plausible that its defining terms ('plane figure' in the case of a circle) should be constitutive of it in the same general way as physical matter constitutes something physical. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1) | |||
| A reaction: It strikes me that an appropriate translation for the Greek 'hule' might be the English 'ingredients', since Fine seems to be right about the broad application of hule in Aristotle. |