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| 12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori |
| Full Idea: Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity. | |||
| From: report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §1 | |||
| A reaction: [her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity. |