Ideas from 'Nihilism without Self-Contradiction' by David Liggins [2008], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics' (ed/tr Le Poidevin,R) [CUP 2008,978-0-521-73544-5]].

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2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances
                        Full Idea: We should interpret philosophers as if their own theory of the meaning of their utterances were true, whether or not we agree with that theory.
                        From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8)
                        A reaction: This seems to give legitimate grounds for some sorts of ad hominem objections. It would simply be an insult to a philosopher not to believe their theories, and then apply them to what they have said. This includes semantic theories.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong
                        Full Idea: It is quite standard to interpret sentences of the form 'There are Fs' using a singular quantifier and a singular predicate, but this tradition may be mistaken.
                        From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8)
                        A reaction: Liggins is clearly in support of the use of plural quantification, referring to 'there are some xs such that'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys
                        Full Idea: We can interpret '..is a part of..' as '..are among..': the xs are a part of the ys just when the xs are among the ys (though if the ys are 'one' then they would not have parts).
                        From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 9)
                        A reaction: The trouble is that this still leaves us with gerrymandered 'parts', in the form of xs that are scattered randomly among the ys. That's not what we mean by 'part'. No account of identity works if it leaves out coherent structure.