Ideas from 'Abstract Entities' by Chris Swoyer [2008], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics' (ed/tr Sider/Hawthorne/Zimmerman) [Blackwell 2008,978-1-4051-1229-1]].

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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space)
                        Full Idea: Many things that seem to be abstract also seem to have a beginning (and ending) in time, such as a language like Urdu. It may be tempting to say that such things exist in time but not in space, but where exactly?
                        From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 1.1)
                        A reaction: A few distinctions might be needed. Urdu-speaking is an ability of certain people. We abstract from that their 'language'. There is nothing there apart from that ability. It has no more abstract existence than the 'weather'.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing
                        Full Idea: Four things philosophers often want to know about a given sort of entity are: its existence conditions, its identity conditions, its modal status, and its epistemic status.
                        From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 3)
                        A reaction: I prefer 'modal profile' to 'modal status'. The 'existence conditions' sound rather epistemic. Why does the existence of anything require 'conditions' other than just existing? I suspect identity is irrelevant if humans aren't around.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Can properties exemplify other properties?
                        Full Idea: Can properties themselves exemplify properties?
                        From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 3)
                        A reaction: Since I espouse a rather strict causal view of true properties, and lump the rest into the category of 'predicates', I am inclined to answer 'no' to this. Most people would disagree. 'Bright red' seems to be an example. But it isn't.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things
                        Full Idea: Quantum field theory strongly suggests that there are (at the fundamental level) no individual, particular things.
                        From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 2.1)
                        A reaction: When people introduce quantum theory into ontological discussions I reach for my shotgun, but it does rather look as if things turn to mush at the bottom level.