Ideas from 'Causation and Laws of Nature' by Jonathan Schaffer [2008], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics' (ed/tr Sider/Hawthorne/Zimmerman) [Blackwell 2008,978-1-4051-1229-1]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions
                        Full Idea: An analysis is an attempt at providing finite, non-circular, and intuitively adequate necessary and sufficient conditions.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3)
                        A reaction: Specifying the 'conditions' for something doesn't seem to quite add up to telling you what the thing is. A trivial side-effect might qualify as a sufficient condition for something, if it always happens.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing
                        Full Idea: 'Reification' occurs when a mere concept is mistaken for a thing. We seem generally prone to this sort of error.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.1)
                        A reaction: Personally I think we should face up to the fact that this is the only way we can think about generalised or abstract entities, and stop thinking of it as an 'error'. We have evolved to think well about objects, so we translate everything that way.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood
                        Full Idea: System T is a normal modal system augmented with the reflexivity-generating axiom □p→p, and is, I think, the best modal logic for modeling lawhood.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n46)
                        A reaction: Schaffer shows in the article why transitivity would not be appropriate for lawhood.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science
                        Full Idea: Science represents our best systematic understanding of the world, and if a certain notion proves unneeded in our best attempt at that, this provides strong evidence that what this notion concerns is not ontologically basic.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.2)
                        A reaction: But is the objective of science to find out what is 'ontologically basic'? If scientists can't get a purchase on a question, they have no interest in it. What are electrons made of?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality)
                        Full Idea: Theoretical reduction concerns terms found in a theory; Definitional reduction concerns concepts found in the mind; Ontological reduction is independent of how we conceptualize entities, or theorize about them, and is about reality.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 1)
                        A reaction: An Aristotelian definition refers to reality, rather than to our words or concepts.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are the same as events
                        Full Idea: Tropes can be identified with events.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n17)
                        A reaction: This is presumably on the view of events, associated with Kim, as instantiations of properties. This idea is a new angle on tropes and events which had never occurred to me.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one
                        Full Idea: Individuation principles are attempts to describe how to count entities in a given domain, by saying when there is one.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3)
                        A reaction: At last, someone tells me what they mean by 'individuation'! So it is just saying what your units are prior to counting, followed (presumably) by successful counting. It seems to aim more at kinds than at particulars.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible
                        Full Idea: The only plausible link from conceivability to possibility is via ideal conceivability.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n22)
                        A reaction: [He cites Chalmers 2002] I'm not sure what 'via' could mean here. Since I don't know any other way than attempted conceivability for assessing a possibility, I am a bit baffled by this idea.