Ideas from 'Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism' by John Hawthorne [2008], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics' (ed/tr Sider/Hawthorne/Zimmerman) [Blackwell 2008,978-1-4051-1229-1]].
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
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14590
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If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way?
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Full Idea:
In being willing to countenance archipelagos, one embraces scattered objects. Why not then embrace the 'archipelago' of my car and the Eiffel Tower?
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From:
John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 2.1)
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A reaction:
This is a beautifully simple and striking point. Language is full of embracing terms like 'the furniture', but that doesn't mean we assume the furniture is unified. The archipelago is less of an 'object' if you live on one of the islands.
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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14591
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Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones
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Full Idea:
Self-proclaimed four-dimensionalists typically adopt a picture that reckons instantaneous objects (and facts about them) to be more fundamental than long-lived ones.
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From:
John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 2.2)
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A reaction:
A nice elucidation. As in Idea 14588, this seems motivated by a desire for some sort of foundationalism or atomism. Why shouldn't a metaphysic treat the middle-sized or temporally extended as foundational, and derive the rest that way?
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
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14589
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A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all?
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Full Idea:
One person says 'He can't dig a hole; he hasn't got a spade', and another says 'He can dig a hole; just give him a spade', and both uses of the modal 'can' will be true. So some philosophers say that all modal predications are thus context-dependent.
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From:
John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 1.2)
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A reaction:
Quine is the guru for this view of modality. Hawthorne's example seems to me to rely too much on the linguistic feature of contrasting 'can' and 'can't'. The underlying assertion in the propositions says something real about the possibilities.
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
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14588
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Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions
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Full Idea:
Nowadays it is common for metaphysicians to hold both that space-time regions are less fundamental than the space-time points that compose them, and that facts about the regions are less fundamental than facts about the points and their arrangements.
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From:
John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 1)
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A reaction:
I'm not quite sure what a physicist would make of this. It seems to be motivated by some a priori preference for atomism, and for system-building from minimal foundations.
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