Ideas from 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier' by Gottfried Leibniz [1691], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Leibniz Akademie Edition' by Leibniz,Gottfried (ed/tr [Berlin Akademie]) [Berline Akademie 1999,]].

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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

12719

Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded

			Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
			From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
			A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time

12720

Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist

			Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
			From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
			A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.