Ideas from 'De modo distinguendi phaenomena' by Gottfried Leibniz [1685], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Leibniz Akademie Edition' by Leibniz,Gottfried (ed/tr [Berlin Akademie]) [Berline Akademie 1999,]].

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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

12741

If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived

			Full Idea: Even if this whole life were said to be only a dream, and the visible world only a phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough if we were never deceived by it when we make good use of reason.
			From: Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1502), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
			A reaction: I find this response more satisfactory than his response in Idea 12740. As a supporter of the coherence account of justification, I take the closest we get to knowledge to be when our full critical faculties and experience are brought to bear, and shared.

12740

The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction

			Full Idea: The most powerful criterion of the reality of phenomena, sufficient even by itself, is success in predicting future phenomena from past and present ones.
			From: Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1502), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
			A reaction: I would say that this is clutching at straws, as there is no reason at all to deny that dreams could be thoroughly coherent and predictable in their events. We must just live with these doubts, not try to defeat them.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique

12721

Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension

			Full Idea: Concerning bodies I can demonstrate that not merely light, heat, color, and similar qualities are apparent but also motion, figure, and extension.
			From: Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1504), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
			A reaction: Leibniz is not consistent on this. Here he is flirting with idealism, but he often backs away from that. In Discourse §12 he makes secondary qualities certainly subjective, and primary qualities possibly so. He admits the primaries contain eternal truths.