Ideas from 'Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy' by Simon Blackburn [1994], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy' by Blackburn,Simon [OUP 1996,0-19-283134-8]].

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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6451	Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world

			Full Idea: In the case of vision, sense data are a kind of inner picture show which itself only indirectly represents aspects of the external world.
			From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.347)
			A reaction: I'm unsure whether this is correct. Russell says the 'roughness' of the table is the sense datum. If it is even a possibility that there are unsensed sense-data, then they cannot be an aspect of the mind, as Blackburn is suggesting they are.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

2866	A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion

			Full Idea: Reliabilism is open to the counterexample that a belief may be the result of some generally reliable process (a pressure gauge) which was in fact malfunctioning on this occasion, when we would be reluctant to attribute knowledge to the subject.
			From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.327)
			A reaction: Russell's stopped clock that tells the right time twice a day. A good objection. Coming from a reliable source is very good criterion for good justification, but it needs critical assessment.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism

2864	The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion

			Full Idea: Critics say that intuitionism in ethics explains nothing, but may merely function as a disguise for prejudice or passion.
			From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.198)
			A reaction: If someone claims to have an important moral intuition about something, you should carefully assess the person who has the intuition. I would trust some people a lot.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism

2865	Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it

			Full Idea: Critics of prescriptivism have noted the problem that whilst accepting a command seems tantamount to setting oneself to obey it, accepting an ethical verdict is, unfortunately, consistent with refusing to be bound by it.
			From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.300)
			A reaction: We nearly all of us accept that our behaviour should be better than it actually is, so we accept the oughts but fail to act. Actually 'refusing', though, sounds a bit contradictory.