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| 13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong |
| Full Idea: The 'aggregative' objection to classical extensional mereology is that it assigns simply the wrong, set-like conditions of existence and spatio-temporal location to ordinary material objects. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 5.1) | |||
| A reaction: [She attributes this to Kit Fine] The point is that there is more to a whole than just some parts, otherwise you could scatter the parts across the globe (or even across time) and claim that the object still existed. It's obvious really. |
| 13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations |
| Full Idea: Two conceptions of logical consequence: a substitutional account, where no substitution of non-logical terms for others (of the right syntactic category) produce true premises and false conclusions; and model theory, where no interpretation can do it. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.2 n8) | |||
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system |
| Full Idea: 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' may be necessarily truth-preserving, but it would not be classified as logically valid by standard systems of logic. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.2) |
| 14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures |
| Full Idea: Those who hold that not all mathematical questions can be concerned with structural matters can point to 'why are π or e transcendental?' or 'how are the prime numbers distributed?' as questions about particular features in the domain. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.1 n6) | |||
| A reaction: [She cites Mac Lane on this] The reply would have to be that we only have those particular notions because we have abstracted them from structures, as in deriving π for circles. |
| 13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts |
| Full Idea: Structures make available positions or places for objects, and place restraints on the type of constituent, and on their configuration. ...These lead to restrictions on the number of objects, and on which parts of the structure are invariable. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.6) | |||
| A reaction: [compressed] That's a pretty good first shot at saying what a structure is, which I have so far not discovered any other writer willing to do. I take this to be an exploration of what Aristotle meant by 'form'. |
| 14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds |
| Full Idea: The 'categorical' properties are roughly those that concern what goes on in the actual world; the properties excluded from that family are the 'hypothetical' ones, which concern what goes on in other worlds. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.2.3.1) | |||
| A reaction: The awkward guest at this little party is the 'dispositional' properties, which are held to exist in the actual world, but have implications for other worlds. I'm a fan of them. |
| 14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object |
| Full Idea: My project is to put the notion of structure or form squarely back at the center of any adequate account of the notion of part, whole and object. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: Excellent. It is the fault of logicians, who presumably can't cope with such elusive and complex concepts, that we have ended up with objects as lists of things or properties, or quantifications over them. |
| 13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up |
| Full Idea: If a whole is just a structure, we wonder how the guests could really be part of the dinner party seating structure, when the complex whole is fully exhausted by the structure that specifies the slots. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 4.2.2) | |||
| A reaction: This cuts both ways. A dinner party may necessarily require guests, but the seating plan can be specified in the absence of any guests, who may never turn up. A seating plan is not a dinner party. Perhaps we have two objects here. |
| 14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure |
| Full Idea: That objects are compounds of matter and form yields a solution to the Problem of Constitution: the clay is merely a proper part of the statue (viz. its matter); the 'remainder' of the statue is its formal or structural components which distinguish it. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Info) | |||
| A reaction: Thus philosophers have thought that it might consist of two objects because they have failed to grasp what an 'object' is. I would add that we need to mention 'essence', so that the statue can survive minor modifications. This is the solution! |
| 13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution |
| Full Idea: The statue and the clay appear to differ in modal properties (such as being able to survive squashing), and temporal properties (coming into existence after the lump of clay), and in constitution (only the statue is constituted of the clay). | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2) | |||
| A reaction: I think the modal properties are the biggest problem here. You can't say a thing and its constitution are different objects, as they are necessarily connected. Structure comes into existence at t, but the structure isn't the whole object. |
| 14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry |
| Full Idea: The notion of structure or form, far from being a mysterious and causally inert invention of philosophers, lies at the very center of many scientific and other rigorous endeavours, such as mathematics, logic, linguistics, chemistry and music. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: This echoes my own belief exactly, and places Aristotle at the centre of the modern stage. Her list of subjects is intriguing, and will need a bit of thought. |
| 13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity |
| Full Idea: The view that constitution is identity has many versions: eliminativism (van Inwagen), identity relative to time (Gallois), identity relativized to sort (Geach), four-dimensionalism (Lewis, Sider), contingent identity (Gibbard), dominant kinds (Burke). | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2 n17) | |||
| A reaction: [she offers other names- useful footnote] Eliminativism says there is no identity. Gallois's view is Heraclitus. Geach seems to deny nature, since sorts are partly conventional. 4-D, nah! Gibbard: it could be the thing but lack its identity? Kinds wrong. |
| 14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times |
| Full Idea: Parthood (for the three-dimensionalist) must be a three-place relation between pairs of objects and times, not the timeless two-place relation at work in the original Calculus of Individuals. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 2.2) |
| 13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings |
| Full Idea: A building may be composed of proper parts which are themselves buildings; a particular pattern may be composed of proper parts which are themselves patterns (even the same pattern, on a smaller scale). | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.12) | |||
| A reaction: This strikes me as a rather important observation, if you are (erroneously) trying to establish the identity of a thing simply by categorising its type. |
| 13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them |
| Full Idea: The modern theory of parts and wholes was intended primarily to replace set theory; in this way, wholes came out looking as much like sets as they possibly could, without set theory's commitment to an infinite hierarchy of abstract objects. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: A very nice clarificatory remark, which explains well this rather baffling phenomenon of people who think there is nothing more to a whole than a pile of parts, as if a scrap heap were the same as a fleet of motor cars. |
| 14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties |
| Full Idea: A commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities that are numerically distinct from their parts (by Leibniz's Law, they don't share all of their properties - the parts typically exist, but the whole doesn't, prior to its creation). | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.1) | |||
| A reaction: Presumably in classical mereology no act of 'creation' is needed, since all the parts in the universe already form all the possible wholes into which they might combine, however bizarrely. |
| 13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts |
| Full Idea: In my approach (as in that of Plato and Aristotle), wholes are in no way identified with parts; rather, a commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities numerically distinct from their proper parts. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.11) | |||
| A reaction: Calling the whole an 'entity' doesn't seem to capture it. She seems to think there are some extra parts, in addition to the material parts, that make something a whole. I think this might be a category mistake. A structure is an abstraction. |
| 14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability |
| Full Idea: Theoretical terms such as 'mass', 'force', 'motion', 'species' and 'phlogiston' seem to indicate that the Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms is committed to an excessive amount of stability in the meaning and reference of such expressions. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.6.2) | |||
| A reaction: This sounds right to me. The notion of 'rigid' designation gives a nice framework for modal logic, but it doesn't seem to fit the shifting patterns of scientific thought. |
| 13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one |
| Full Idea: Natural kinds are said to stand out from other classifications because they support legitimate inductive inferences ...as when we observe that past samples of copper conduct electricity and infer that the next sample will too. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.3.1) | |||
| A reaction: A slightly more precise version of the Upanishad definition of natural kinds which I favour (Idea 8153). If you can't predict the next one from the previous one, it isn't a natural kind. You can't quite predict the next tiger from the previous one. |
| 13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry |
| Full Idea: Candidate species concepts can be intrinsic: morphological, physiological or genetic similarity; or relational: biology such as interbreeding and reproductive isolation, ecology, such as mate recognition in a niche, or phylogenetics (ancestor relations). | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.4.1) | |||
| A reaction: She says the relational ones are more popular, but I gather they all hit problems. See John Dupré on the hopelessness of the whole task. |
| 13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? |
| Full Idea: It is controversial whether classificatory expressions from the vernacular should ever really be counted as genuine natural kind terms. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.2) | |||
| A reaction: This is a similar confrontation between the folk and the scientific specialist as we find in folk psychology. There are good defences of folk psychology, and it looks plausible to defend the folk classifications as having priority. |
| 13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species |
| Full Idea: It has been observed that there are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species. | |||
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.4.1) | |||
| A reaction: The central concept of biology I take to be a 'mechanism'. and I suspect that this view of science is actually applicable in physics and chemistry, with so-called 'laws' being a merely superficial description of what is going on. |