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Ideas from 'On the Nature of Moral Values' by Willard Quine [1978], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Theories and Things' by Quine,Willard [Harvard 1981,0-674-87926-0]].

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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
21750 Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation
                        Full Idea: Science, thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth.
                        From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.63)
                        A reaction: I would describe what he is affirming as a 'robust' theory of truth. An interesting aside, given his usual allegiance to disquotational, and even redundancy, accounts of truth. You can hardly rely on observations if you think they contain no truth.
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
21748 More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method
                        Full Idea: Our inductions become increasingly explicit and deliberate, and in the fulness of time we even rise above induction, to the hypothetico-deductive method.
                        From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.57)
                        A reaction: This seems to defer to Hempel's account of scientific theorising. I wander what exactly 'rising above' means?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
21749 Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices
                        Full Idea: Altruistic values attach to satisfactions of other persons, without regard to ulterior satisfactions accruing to oneself. Ceremonial values attach to practices of one's society, without regard to satisfactions accruing to oneself.
                        From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.58)
                        A reaction: An interesting distinction, but probably as blurred and circular as (according to Quine) the analytic/synthetic distinction.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
21751 Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself
                        Full Idea: One cannot reasonably be called upon to love even one's neighbour quite as oneself. Is love to diminish inversely as the square of the distance? Is it to extend to other species than one's own?
                        From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.65)
                        A reaction: Quine isn't actually saying that love is inherently egoistic, but that is the implication. The power of my love is at its most powerful when it is closest to home.