Ideas from 'Letters to Frege' by Bertrand Russell [1902], by Theme Structure

[found in 'From Frege to Gödel 1879-1931' (ed/tr Heijenoort,Jean van) [Harvard 1967,0-674-32449-8]].

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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox
                        Full Idea: Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox.
                        From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference §2
Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing
                        Full Idea: Russell's paradox showed that we cannot consistently assume what is sometimes called the 'naďve comprehension principle', namely that every property is collectivizing.
                        From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.6
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property
                        Full Idea: Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property.
                        From: report of Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 6.1
                        A reaction: This is the principle stumbling block to any attempt to explain properties purely in terms of sets. I would say that Russell proved there couldn't be a set for each predicate. You can't glibly equate proper properties with predicates.
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert
                        Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
                        A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts.