PhilosophyIdeas.com Database     |     Current Total Ideas: 22,967     |     home     |     back

Ideas from 'Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?' by Dorothy Edgington [1986], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic' (ed/tr Hughes,R.I.G.) [Hackett 1993,0-87220-181-3]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     unexpand these ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
13857 Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake
                        Full Idea: How likely is a fair die landing on an even number to land six? My approach is, assume an even number, so three possibilities, one a six, so 'one third'; the truth-functional approach is it's true if it is not-even or six, so 'two-thirds'.
                        From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 3)
                        A reaction: The point is that in the truth-functional approach, if the die lands not-even, then the conditional comes out as true, when she says it should be irrelevant. She seems to be right about this.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
13853 It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is
                        Full Idea: The mistake philosophers have made, in trying to understand the conditional, is to assume that its function is to make a statement about how the world is (or how other possible worlds are related to it), true or false, as the case may be.
                        From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
                        A reaction: 'If pigs could fly we would never catch them' may not be about the world, but 'if you press this switch the light comes on' seems to be. Actually even the first one is about the world. I've an inkling that Edgington is wrong about this. Powers!
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
13855 A conditional does not have truth conditions
                        Full Idea: A conditional does not have truth conditions.
                        From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
13859 X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B
                        Full Idea: X believes that if A, B, to the extent that he judges that A & B is nearly as likely as A, or (roughly equivalently) to the extent that he judges A & B to be more likely than A & ¬B.
                        From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 5)
                        A reaction: This is a formal statement of her theory of conditionals.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
13854 Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition
                        Full Idea: It is often necessary to suppose (or assume) that some epistemic possibility is true, and to consider what else would be the case, or would be likely to be the case, given this supposition. The conditional expresses the outcome of such thought processes.
                        From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
                        A reaction: This is the basic Edgington view. It seems to involve an active thought process, and imagination, rather than being the static semantic relations offered by possible worlds analyses. True conditionals state relationships in the world.