Ideas from 'On the Source of Necessity' by Ross P. Cameron [2010], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Modality' (ed/tr Hale,B/Hoffman,A) [OUP 2010,]].
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
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15102
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S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one)
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Full Idea:
S4 says there must be some necessary truths, because the actual necessary truths must be necessary. (It says if there are some actual necessary truths then that is so - but the S4 axiom is an actual necessary truth, if true).
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From:
Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2)
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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15103
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Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent
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Full Idea:
I conclude that Blackburn has not shown that any grounding of the necessary in the contingent (the Contingency Horn of his dilemma) is doomed to failure.
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From:
Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2)
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A reaction:
[You must read the article for details of Cameron's argument!] He goes on to also reject the Necessity Horn (that there is a regress if necessities must rely on necessities).
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
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15104
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The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically
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Full Idea:
What seems so wrong about the 'moving spotlight' theory is that here one time is privileged, but all the times are on a par ontologically.
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From:
Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 4)
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A reaction:
The whole thing is baffling, but this looks like a good point. All our intuitions make presentism (there's only the present) look like a better theory than the moving spotlight (that the present is just 'special').
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