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| 19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value |
| Full Idea: A 'myth' or fiction for me is a true internal statement (a statement endorsed by the rules) whose external truth value is as may be, the point being that that truth value is from an internal standpoint quite irrelevant. | |||
| From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], IX) | |||
| A reaction: This contrasts with Carnap, for whom talk of 'ghosts' is false in an internal thing-framework. Yablo seems here to say a statement can be true while having no truth value. Presumably he is relaxing the internal rules. |
| 19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures |
| Full Idea: Make-believe games can make it easier to reason about facts, to systematize them, to visualize them, to spot connections with other facts, and to evaluate potential lines of research. | |||
| From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], XI) | |||
| A reaction: This is the key pragmatic defence of the fictionalist view of abstract objects. Fictions are devices to help us think better. I think a lot of ontology turns out that way. |
| 19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' |
| Full Idea: It is an open question whether the clouds that we call 'angry' are literally F, for any F other than 'such that it would be natural and proper to regard them as angry if one were going to attribute emotions to clouds'. | |||
| From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], XII) | |||
| A reaction: His point is that it is TRUE, in those circumstances, that the clouds are angry. Thus fictions are a valid and useful part of ordinary sensible course, giving real information. I like it. |