Ideas from 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson' by Jonathan Schaffer [2009], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Books' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup'
                        Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
                        A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations
                        Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
                        From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
                        A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?