### Ideas from 'Getting Causes from Powers' by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum [2011], by Theme Structure

#### [found in 'Getting Causes from Powers' by Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S. [OUP 2011,978-0-19-969561-4]].

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###### 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
 14562 A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers
###### 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
 14541 Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs
###### 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
 14553 Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction
###### 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
 14538 Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars
###### 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
 14555 Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do
###### 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
 14557 Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers
###### 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
 14583 Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities
###### 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
 14536 We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable
###### 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
 14584 The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention
###### 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
 14582 Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality?
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 14542 If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined
###### 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
 14535 Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers
###### 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
 14561 Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
 14579 Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases
 14580 Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
 14552 Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
 14578 Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds
###### 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
 14549 Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers
###### 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
 14585 We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example
###### 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
 14576 Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim
###### 14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
 14551 If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple
 14571 The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things
###### 14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
 14570 Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects
###### 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
 14569 It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation
###### 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
 14568 A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure
###### 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
 14556 Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness
###### 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
 14566 Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices
 14577 Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers?
###### 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
 14563 Causation is the passing around of powers
###### 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
 14587 We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced
###### 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
 14533 Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process
 14558 A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones
 14559 Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process?
 14565 Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another
###### 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
 14567 Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one
###### 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
 14537 Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse
###### 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
 14572 Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause?
 14573 Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false
 14574 Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation
###### 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
 14539 Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects
 14550 We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects
 14546 Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that
###### 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
 14575 A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force
###### 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
 14548 There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it
###### 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
 14554 Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers
 14564 If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)!