Ideas from 'Getting Causes from Powers' by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum [2011], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Getting Causes from Powers' by Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S. [OUP 2011,978-0-19-969561-4]].
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
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14562
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A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
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14541
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Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
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14553
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Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
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14538
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Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
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14555
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Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
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14557
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Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
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14583
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Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
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14536
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We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
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14584
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The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
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14582
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Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality?
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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14542
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If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
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14535
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Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
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14561
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Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
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14579
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Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases
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14580
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Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
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14552
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Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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14578
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Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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14549
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Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
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14585
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We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
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14576
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Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim
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14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
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14551
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If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple
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14571
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The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
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14570
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Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
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14569
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It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
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14568
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A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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14556
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Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
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14566
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Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices
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14577
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Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers?
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
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14563
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Causation is the passing around of powers
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
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14587
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We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
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14533
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Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process
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14558
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A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones
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14559
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Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process?
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14565
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Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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14567
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Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
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14537
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Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
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14572
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Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause?
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14573
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Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false
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14574
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Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
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14539
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Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects
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14550
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We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects
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14546
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Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
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14575
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A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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14548
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There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
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14554
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Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers
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14564
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If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)!
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