Ideas from 'Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations'' by Norman Malcolm [1954], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Review' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain
                        Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain.
                        From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44
                        A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling?