Ideas from 'Philosophy of Language' by Scott Soames [2010], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy of Language' by Soames,Scott [Princeton 2010,978-0-691-13866-4]].

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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism
                        Full Idea: The chief philosophical interest in quantified modal logic lies with metaphysical necessity, essentialism, and the nontrivial modal de re.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position
                        Full Idea: The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight
                        Full Idea: Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, rather than a singular term, is a real insight.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22)
                        A reaction: 'Would the man who threw the stone come forward' seems like a different usage from 'would the man in the black hat come forward'.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics
                        Full Idea: Since Frege and Russell were mainly interested in formalizing mathematics, the only quantifiers they needed were the universal and existential one.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22)
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths
                        Full Idea: The set of metaphysically necessary truths is larger than the set of logically necessary truths.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)
                        A reaction: Likewise, the set of logically possible truths is much larger than the set of metaphysically possible truths. If a truth is logically necessary, it will clearly be metaphysically necessary. Er, unless it is necessitated by daft logic...
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life
                        Full Idea: Our understanding of metaphysical necessity is intuitive - drawn from our ordinary thought and talk.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)
                        A reaction: This, of course, is a good reason for analytic philosophers to dislike metaphysical necessity.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts
                        Full Idea: The systematic study of meaning requires a framework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
                        A reaction: Soames presents this as common sense, on the first page of his book, and it is hard to disagree. Representation will shade off into studying the workings of the mind. Fodor seems a good person to start with.
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings
                        Full Idea: The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
                        A reaction: Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa
                        Full Idea: Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states.
                        From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
                        A reaction: Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault.