Ideas from 'Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties' by Ross P. Cameron [2009], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics' (ed/tr Le Poidevin/Simons etc) [Routledge 2012,978-0-415-49396-3]].

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?
                        Full Idea: We could abandon the view that truthmakers necessitate the truth of that which makes them true, and say that an object makes a truth when its intrinsic nature suffices for that truth. The object would have a different intrinsic nature if the truth failed.
                        From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers')
                        A reaction: [He cites Josh Parsons 1999, 2005 for this] This approach seems closely related to Kit Fine's proposal that necessities arise from the natures of things. It sounds to me as if an object with that intrinsic nature would necessitate that truth.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
                        Full Idea: The most popular view is that an object is a truthmaker if the object couldn't exist and the truth be false. But contingent predications are also held to need truthmakers. Socrates is not necessarily snub-nosed, so a trope or state of affairs is needed.
                        From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers')
                        A reaction: Cameron calls this 'some heavy ontological commitments'. If snub-nosedness is necessitated by the trope of 'being snub-nosed', what is the truthmaker for Socrates having that trope?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings
                        Full Idea: The essentialist approach would be to say that an intrinsic property is one such that it is no part of what it is to instantiate that property that the bearer stands in some relation to its surroundings.
                        From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Analysis')
                        A reaction: This is offered as an alternative to the David Lewis account in terms of duplicates across possible worlds. You will have gathered by now, if you have spent days poring over my stuff, that I favour the essentialist approach.
An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently
                        Full Idea: Intrinsic properties are those that an object has solely in virtue of how it is, independently of its surroundings.
                        From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Intro')
                        A reaction: Better not mention quantum mechanics and fields if you want to talk of objects being independent of their surroundings. Am I 'independent' of gravity, or is gravity 'independent' of me?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one
                        Full Idea: Criteria for identity across times have proven hard to give. Whatever criteria we lay down, it seems that there are possible situations in which two later objects bear the relevant relation to one earlier object, though only one of them can be identical.
                        From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Personal')
                        A reaction: We only have to think of twins, amoebae that fission, and the Ship of Theseus. We seem to end up inventing a dubious criterion in order to break the tie.