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| 18487 | We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' |
| Full Idea: The generalisation 'What makes a (any) sentence true?' is not a request for definitions of 'true' (the concept), but rather requests for (partial) explanations of why certain particular sentences are true. | |||
| From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II) | |||
| A reaction: McFetridge is responding to the shortcomings of Tarski's account of truth. The mystery seems to be why some of our representations of the world are 'successful', and others are not. |
| 18488 | We normally explain natural events by citing further facts |
| Full Idea: If one were asked 'What makes salt soluble in water?', the most natural answer would be something of the style 'The fact that it has such-and-such structure'. | |||
| From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II) | |||
| A reaction: Personally I would want to talk about its 'powers' (dispositional properties), rather than its 'structure' (categorical properties). This defends facts, but you could easily paraphrase 'fact' out of this reply (as McFetridge realised). |