Ideas from 'Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences' by Anjan Chakravarrty [2012], by Theme Structure

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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership
                        Full Idea: Powers explain behaviours regardless of whether they are necessary for membership in a particular class of things.
                        From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3)
                        A reaction: This seems right, and is important for driving a wedge between powers and essences. If there are essences, they are not simply some bunch of powers.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class
                        Full Idea: The modern concept of a kind essence is a set of intrinsic properties that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the membership of something in a class of things, or 'kind'.
                        From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
                        A reaction: I am always struck by the problem that the kind itself is constructed from the individuals, so circularity always seems to loom.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence'
                        Full Idea: The fact that members of some cluster kinds are subjects of causal generalizations reflects the degree to which they share causally efficacious properties, not the fact that they may be composed of essence kinds per se.
                        From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
                        A reaction: I think this is right. I am a fan of individual essences, but not of kind essences. I take kinds, and kind explanations, to be straightforward inductive generalisations from individuals. Extreme stabilities give the illusion of a kind essence.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them
                        Full Idea: Scientific practices such as prediction and explanation regarding causal phenomena are concerned not merely with kinds having essences, but also with kinds lacking them.
                        From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 1)
                        A reaction: Not quite clear what he has in mind, but explanation should certainly involve a coherent picture, and not just the citation of some underlying causal mechanism.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not
                        Full Idea: Many of the kinds we theorize about and experiment on today simply do not have essences. We can distinguish 'essence kinds', such as electrons, and 'cluster kinds', such as biological species.
                        From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
                        A reaction: This is an important point for essentialists. He offers a strict criterion, in Idea 15145, for mind membership, but we might allow species to have essences by just relaxing the criteria a bit, and acknowledging some vagueness, especially over time.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties
                        Full Idea: Causal laws often do not make reference to kinds of objects at all, but rather summarize relations between quantitative, causally efficacious properties of objects.
                        From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3)
                        A reaction: This would only be a serious challenge if it was not possible to translate talk of properties into talk of kinds, and vice versa.