Ideas from 'Identity over Time' by André Gallois [2011], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].

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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change!
                        Full Idea: If things really change, there can't literally be one thing before and after the change. However, if there isn't one thing before and after the change, then no thing has really undergone any change.
                        From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], Intro)
                        A reaction: [He cites Copi for this way of expressing the problem of identity through change] There is an obvious simple ambiguity about 'change' in ordinary English. A change of property isn't a change of object. Painting a red ball blue isn't swapping it.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time
                        Full Idea: We have four versions of Four-Dimensionalism: the relativistic view that time is space-like; a persisting thing is identical with its history (so objects are events); past and future are equally real; or (Lewis) things extend in time, with temporal parts.
                        From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], §2.5)
                        A reaction: Broad proposed the second one. I prefer 3-D: at any given time a thing is wholly present. At another time it is wholly present despite having changed. It is ridiculous to think that small changes destroy identity. We acquire identity by dying??
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary
                        Full Idea: The necessity of identity: a=b; □(a=a); so something necessarily = a; so something necessarily must equal b; so □(a=b). [A summary of the argument of Marcus and Kripke]
                        From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], §3)
                        A reaction: [Lowe 1982 offered a response] The conclusion seems reasonable. If two things are mistakenly thought to be different, but turn out to be one thing, that one thing could not possibly be two things. In no world is one thing two things!