Ideas from 'Guide to Ground' by Kit Fine [2012], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Metaphysical Grounding' (ed/tr Correia,F/Schnieder,B) [CUP 2012,978-1-107-02289-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science

17275

Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism

17282

Truths need not always have their source in what exists

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths

17283

If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence

17286

Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17272

2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing

17276

If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality

17284

An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy

17285

'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways

17288

We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding

17280

Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates

17281

If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

17274

Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science)

17290

Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction

17278

We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

17287

Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

17279

Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

17273

Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation

17289

Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation

17291

We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are)

17271

Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination?

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind

17277

If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa)