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| 16974 | The nature of each logical concept is given by a collection of inference rules |
| Full Idea: The view presented here presupposes that each logical concept is associated with some fixed and well defined collection of rules of inference which characterize its basic logical nature. | |||
| From: Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 4) | |||
| A reaction: [He gives Fine's 'Senses of Essences' 57-8 as a source] He seems to have in mind natural deduction, where the rules are for the introduction and elimination of the concepts. |
| 16973 | Explain logical necessity by logical consequence, or the other way around? |
| Full Idea: One view is that logical consequence is to be understood in terms of logical necessity (some proposition holds necessarily, if some group of other propositions holds). Alternatively, logical necessity is a logical consequence of the empty set. | |||
| From: Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 3) | |||
| A reaction: I think my Finean preference is for all necessities to have a 'necessitator', so logical necessity results from logic in some way, perhaps from logical consequence, or from the essences of the connectives and operators. |