Ideas from 'In Metaphysics' by John Duns Scotus [1304], by Theme Structure

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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

16660

Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate?

			Full Idea: Later standard theories said that a real distinction obtains between two things that can each exist without the other. For Scotus a real distinction requires only that one of the pair be able to exist without the other.
			From: report of John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], V.5-6 n91) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5
			A reaction: His example is the similarity relation, which is independent of the whiteness on which it is based (since the other thing can become non-white).

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

16626

Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being'

			Full Idea: No substance is understood in its own right, except in the most universal of concepts, namely of 'being'.
			From: John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], III n. 116), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.3
			A reaction: This is a fairly standard scholastic pessimism about knowing anything about substance. The modern view suggests that actually scientists know 'substance' pretty well.