Ideas from 'On 'Physics'' by Albert of Saxony [1357], by Theme Structure

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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident
                        Full Idea: Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident.
                        From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], I.18), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
                        A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who base their ontology on first-order classical logic. The more austere reading of that makes the accidents into sets of substances, so it's just substances. All the non-substance stuff cries out for recognition.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist
                        Full Idea: Something can be conceived of as successive simpliciter, with respect to both its substance and its state. For example, if Socrates were continually made and made again by the First Cause, as the Seine flow, so nothing of what preexists remains.
                        From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.4
                        A reaction: This is precisely the problem that modern stage theory faces, of knowing how to connect the stages together.
Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence
                        Full Idea: For existence to hold of completely successive entities it is not required that their parts exist, but that one part succeed another, as a future part succeeds a past part.
                        From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3 ad 2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
                        A reaction: A nice move, but it doesn't quite solve it. How can non-existent things 'succeed one another'? It is worrying for metaphysics that some things have entirely different concepts of persistence from other things.