Ideas from 'Grounding: an opinionated introduction' by Correia,F/Schnieder,B [2012], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Metaphysical Grounding' (ed/tr Correia,F/Schnieder,B) [CUP 2012,978-1-107-02289-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms
                        Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms.
                        From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4)
                        A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts?
                        Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
                        From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
                        A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence?
                        Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
                        From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
                        A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart
                        Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation.
                        From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2)
                        A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are
                        Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
                        From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
                        A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.