Ideas from 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions' by Thomas Hofweber [2006], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.2' (ed/tr Zimmerman,Dean W.) [OUP 2006,978-0-19-929059-8]].
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
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Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English
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Full Idea:
A standard objection to minimalist truth is the 'incompleteness objection'. Since there are propositions inexpressible in present English the concept of truth isn't captured by all the instances of the Tarski biconditional.
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From:
Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 5.3)
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A reaction:
Sounds like a good objection.
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
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Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects
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Full Idea:
The view that all quantification is substitutional is not very plausible in general. Some uses of quantifiers clearly seem to have the function to make a claim about a domain of objects out there, no matter how they relate to the terms in our language.
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From:
Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.1)
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A reaction:
Robust realists like myself are hardly going to say that quantification is just an internal language game.
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
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Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them
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Full Idea:
Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach.
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From:
Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.2)
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A reaction:
A typed approach would imply restrictions on what it can be a property of. 'Green' is a property of surfaces, 'dark' is a property of colours. My first reaction is to opt for type-free.
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
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Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can
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Full Idea:
Holism says that nothing that can be said in one language can be said in another one. The expressibility hypothesis says that everything that can be said in one language can be said in every other one.
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From:
Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 6.4)
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A reaction:
Obviously expressibility would only refer to reasonably comprehensive languages (with basic logical connectives, for example). Personally I vote for the expressibility hypothesis, which Hofweber seems to favour.
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