Ideas from 'Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford' by Ullin T. Place [1999], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Philosophical Quarterly' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

18088

Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental

			Full Idea: My thesis is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional.
			From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 1)
			A reaction: An idea with few friends, but I really like it, because it offers the prospect of a unified account of physical nature and the mind/brain. It seems reasonable to say my mind is essentially a bunch of dispositions. Mind is representations + dispositions.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

18089

Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities

			Full Idea: Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are.
			From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6)
			A reaction: [He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world.