Ideas from 'Aboutness' by Stephen Yablo [2014], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Aboutness' by Yablo,Stephen [Princeton 2014,978-0-691-14495-5]].
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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18996
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A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts
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4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
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19006
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An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
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18999
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y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
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19001
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'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
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19002
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A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
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18998
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Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
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19004
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Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
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19007
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A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
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18993
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If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter
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19003
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Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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18992
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Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
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18994
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The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
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18997
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Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal
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19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
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19005
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Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A
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