Ideas from 'Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress' by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Australasian Journal of Philosophy' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round)
                        Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalists cannot explain the resemblance between particulars in terms of their properties, because they explain particulars' properties in terms of their resemblances.
                        From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress [2001], p.397), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.1
                        A reaction: While resemblance does seem to be a primitive fact of experience, and it points us towards the properties, to say that resemblance explains properties is obviously (as so often...) getting things the wrong way round. Properties ARE resemblances??