Ideas from 'Truthmakers' by Fraser MacBride [2013], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth

18486

We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers

18484

Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation

18466

If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism

18481

Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein

18473

'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths

18483

The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths

18479

There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth

18477

There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths

18482

Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers

18485

Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent

18474

Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have

18490

Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?

18493

Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives

18489

Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not

18476

'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind')

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

18480

Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

18471

Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation

18472

Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'?

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms

18475

Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

18478

Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours