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| 14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x |
| Full Idea: Insofar as identity seems vague, it is provably mistaken. If it is vague whether x and y are identical (as in the Ship of Theseus), then x,y is definitely not the same as x,x, since the first pair is indeterminate and the second pair isn't. | |||
| From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], App I) | |||
| A reaction: [compressed; Gareth Evans 1978 made a similar point] This strikes me as begging the question in the Ship case, since we are shoehorning the new ship into either the slot for x or the slot for y, but that was what we couldn’t decide. No rough identity? |
| 18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism |
| Full Idea: Kripke and Putnam made unsubstantiated claims, indeed false claims, to the effect that the theory of direct reference has nontrivial essentialist import. | |||
| From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], Pref to Exp Ed) | |||
| A reaction: Kripke made very few claims, and is probably innocent of the charge. Most people agree with Salmon that you can't derive metaphysics from a theory of reference. |