Ideas from 'Reference and Essence: seven appendices' by Nathan Salmon [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Reference and Essence (2nd ed)' by Salmon,Nathan [Prometheus 2005,1-59102-215-0]].

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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x
                        Full Idea: Insofar as identity seems vague, it is provably mistaken. If it is vague whether x and y are identical (as in the Ship of Theseus), then x,y is definitely not the same as x,x, since the first pair is indeterminate and the second pair isn't.
                        From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], App I)
                        A reaction: [compressed; Gareth Evans 1978 made a similar point] This strikes me as begging the question in the Ship case, since we are shoehorning the new ship into either the slot for x or the slot for y, but that was what we couldn’t decide. No rough identity?
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism
                        Full Idea: Kripke and Putnam made unsubstantiated claims, indeed false claims, to the effect that the theory of direct reference has nontrivial essentialist import.
                        From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], Pref to Exp Ed)
                        A reaction: Kripke made very few claims, and is probably innocent of the charge. Most people agree with Salmon that you can't derive metaphysics from a theory of reference.