Ideas from 'First Things First' by Earl Conee [2004], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Evidentialism' by Conee,E/Feldman,R [OUP 2004,0-19-925373-0]].

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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism
                        Full Idea: Evidentialism does not support beginning epistemology by taking for granted that evidentialism is true. ...Rather, what potentially justifies belief in intial epistemic data and initial procedures of inquiry is the evidence itself.
                        From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting')
                        A reaction: This sounds good. I much prefer talk of 'evidence' to talk of 'perceptions', because evidence has been licked into shape, and its significance has been clarified. That is the first step towards the coherence we seek.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them
                        Full Idea: Reliabilism would count pure guesses as good reasons if guessing were properly reliable.
                        From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting')
                        A reaction: See D.H. Lawrence's short story 'The Rocking Horse Winner'. This objection strikes me as being so devastating that it is almost conclusive. Except that pure guesses are never ever reliable, over a decent period of time.
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
                        Full Idea: An unrefined reliability theory does a poor job at capturing reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
                        From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Stroud's')
                        A reaction: Reliability can only be a test for tried and tested ways. No one can say whether imagining a range of possibilities is reliable or not. Is prediction a reliable route to knowledge?
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable
                        Full Idea: Sheer reliability does not justify belief. ...It may be, for instance, that we have strong though misleading reason to deny the method's reliability.
                        From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Circles')
                        A reaction: That is, we accept a justification if we judge the method to be reliable, not if it IS reliable. I can disbelieve all the reliable information that arrives in my mind. People do that all the time! Hatred of experts! Support for internalism?