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| 19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) |
| Full Idea: If it is intellectually required that one try to believe all and only truths (as Chisholm says), ...then it is possible to believe some unsubstantiated proposition in a reckless endeavour to believe a truth, and happen to be right. | |||
| From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Justification') | |||
| A reaction: This implies doxastic voluntarism. Sorry! I meant, this implies that we can control what we believe, when actually we believe what impinges on us as facts. |
| 19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs |
| Full Idea: Our limited cognitive capacities lead Goldman to deny a principle instructing people to believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs, since they are unable to have the infinite number of beliefs that following such a principle would require. | |||
| From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Doxastic') | |||
| A reaction: This doesn't sound like much of an objection to epistemic closure, which I took to be the claim that you know the 'known' entailments of your knowledge. |