Ideas from 'Contextualism Contested (and reply)' by Earl Conee [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)' (ed/tr Steup/Turri/Sosa) [Wiley Blackwell 2014,978-0-470-67209-9]].

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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism

19555

People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant

			Full Idea: Fluent speakers typically become increasingly hesitant about 'knowledge' attributions as the practical significance of the right answer increases.
			From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Epistemic')
			A reaction: The standard examples of this phenomenon are in criminal investigations, and in philosophical discussions of scepticism. Simple observations I take to have maximum unshakable confidence, except in extreme global scepticism contexts.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism

19557

Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge

			Full Idea: Maybe variable knowledge ascriptions are just loose talk. This is shown when we ask whether weakly supported knowledge is 'really' or 'truly' or 'really and truly' known. Fluent speakers have a strong inclination to doubt or deny that it is.
			From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Loose')
			A reaction: [bit compressed] Conee is suggesting the people are tacitly invariantist about knowledge (they have a fixed standard). But it may be that someone who asks 'do you really and truly know?' is raising the contextual standard. E.g. a barrister.

19556

Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards

			Full Idea: It may be that all 'knowledge' attributions have the same truth conditions, but people apply contextually varying standards. The most plausible standard for truth is very high, but not unreachably high.
			From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Loose')
			A reaction: This is the 'invariantist' alternative to contextualism about knowledge. Is it a standard 'for truth'? Either it is or it isn't true, so there isn't a standard. I take the standard to concern the justification.