Ideas from 'There is No A Priori (and reply)' by Michael Devitt [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)' (ed/tr Steup/Turri/Sosa) [Wiley Blackwell 2014,978-0-470-67209-9]].

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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

19565

How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality?

			Full Idea: What non-experiential link to reality could support insights into its necessary character?
			From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 4)
			A reaction: The key to it, I think, is your theory of mind. If you are a substance dualist, then connecting to such deep things looks fine, but if you are a reductive physicalist then it looks absurdly hopeful.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori

19564

Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that

			Full Idea: It is overwhelmingly plausible that some knowledge is empirical. The attractive thesis of naturalism is that all knowledge is; there is only one way of knowing.
			From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 1)
			A reaction: How many ways for us to know seems to depend on what faculties we have. We lump our senses together under a single heading. The arrival of data is not the same as the arrival of knowledge. I'm unconvinced that naturalists like me must accept this.