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19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers |
Full Idea: Much theorizing about justification conflates issues of justified belief with issues of justified/blameless believers. | |||
From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.12) | |||
A reaction: [They cite Kent Bach 1985] Presumably the only thing that really justifies a belief is the truth, or the actual facts. You could then say 'p is a justified belief, though no one actually believes it'. E.g. the number of stars is odd. |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important |
Full Idea: If knowledge is indeed unanalyzable, that could be seen as a liberation of justification to assume importance in its own right. | |||
From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.11) | |||
A reaction: [They cite Kvanvig 2003:192 and Greco 2010:9-] See Scruton's Idea 3897. I suspect that we should just give up discussing 'knowledge', which is a woolly and uninformative term, and focus on where the real epistemological action is. |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') |
Full Idea: Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion. 'Cat' entails 'mammal' because the cats are a subset of the mammals. | |||
From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.10) | |||
A reaction: I would have thought that this was only one type of entailment. 'Travelling to Iceland entails flying'. Travelling includes flying, the reverse of cats/mammals, to a very complex set-theoretic account is needed. Interesting. |