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| 19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification |
| Full Idea: Strong 'access' internalism says the justification must be accessible to the person holding the belief (for cognitive duty, or blame), and weaker 'mentalist' internalism just says the justification must supervene on mental features of the individual. | |||
| From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], III) | |||
| A reaction: [compressed] I think I'm a strong access internalist. I doubt whether there is a correct answer to any of this, but my conception of someone knowing something involves being able to invoke their reasons for it. Even if they forget the source. |
| 19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability |
| Full Idea: Strong foundationalists require truth-preserving inferential links between the foundations and what the foundations support, while weaker versions allow weaker connections, such as inductive support, or best explanation, or probabilistic support. | |||
| From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], II) | |||
| A reaction: [He cites Alston 1989] Personally I'm a coherentist about justification, but I'm a fan of best explanation, so I'd vote for that. It's just that best explanation is not a very foundationalist sort of concept. Actually, the strong version is absurd. |