Ideas from 'Fallibilism' by Trent Dougherty [2011], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Routledge Companion to Epistemology' (ed/tr Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D) [Routledge 2014,978-0-415-72269-8]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     unexpand these ideas


11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them
                        Full Idea: There has been a tendency to treat fallibilism as an alternative to either dogmatism or scepticism. ...But it is much better to think of fallibilism as consistent with either dogmatism or skepticism.
                        From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Closure')
                        A reaction: It seems perfectly reasonably to describe oneself as a 'fallibilist dogmatist' (perhaps from the Pope?), or a 'fallibilist sceptic' (perhaps from Peter Unger?), so this idea sounds correct.
It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge
                        Full Idea: It seems best to take fallible reasons as the basic notion of fallibilism. So fallible knowers are agents who know what they know on the basis of fallible reasons. Fallible knowledge will be knowledge on basis of fallible reasons.
                        From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Cognates')
                        A reaction: This is because an ideal knower would be compelled by the evidence, so if fallibilism is universal it must reside in the evidence and not in the knower (bottom p.131).
We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false'
                        Full Idea: It will ordinarily be conversationally inappropriate to say 'I know that p, but p might be false' even if it is true, since this would mislead an interlocutor to infer that that possibility was an epistemically significant one.
                        From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Epistemic')
                        A reaction: This seems to imply hypocrisy when a fallibilist philosopher claims (in non-philosophical company) to know something. Fair enough. Philosophers are in a permanent state of hypocrisy about what they are really thinking. That's the fun of it.