Ideas from 'The Value Problem' by John Greco [2011], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Routledge Companion to Epistemology' (ed/tr Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D) [Routledge 2014,978-0-415-72269-8]].

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom

19735

Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge

			Full Idea: Intuitively, understanding is more valuable than knowledge and wisdom is more valuable than understanding.
			From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], 'Knowledge')
			A reaction: Down at the bottom is having an 'inkling' of something, I presume. Not convinced of this. I would rate understanding above knowledge, but wisdom seems rather different. It implies a breadth that does not focus on any particular topic.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification

19734

If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion

			Full Idea: Why should knowledge be more valuable than true opinion, if their practical value is the same?
			From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro)
			A reaction: We have exam systems and academic titles to bestow social prestige on people who know, not to mention quiz shows. Modern society needs lots of knowledgeable citizens. I'm not sure what intrinsic value knowledge could have.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification

19733

Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value

			Full Idea: Externalist theories do not give knowledge the sort of value that internalists want knowledge to have.
			From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro)
			A reaction: [He cites Pritchard 2008] This is not a very strong argument, given the uncertainties and complexities in the idea that we share a 'value'. If the value of knowledge is really instrumental (and loved no less because of that), then externalism could cope.