Ideas from 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth' by William James [1908], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Selected Writings of William James' by James,William (ed/tr Bird,Graham) [Everyman 1995,0-460-87557-4]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     unexpand these ideas


2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking
                        Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions.
                        From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh')
                        A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them
                        Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them.
                        From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
                        A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections
                        Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths.
                        From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
                        A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it.