Ideas from 'The Flow of Time' by Huw Price [2011], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time' (ed/tr Callender,Craig) [OUP 2013,978-0-19-967955-3]].

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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Presentism
Presentists lack the materials for a realist view of change
                        Full Idea: The presentist view seems to have lost the materials for a realist view of passage, change or temporal transition.
                        From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 2)
                        A reaction: It is a nice point. How can a presentist talk of change if the only component that exists is the present time slice? Price says change can only be a kind of fiction for the presentist. Change in existence and in properties are distinct concepts.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The present moment, time's direction, and time's dynamic quality seem to be objective facts
                        Full Idea: The flow of time seems to be an objective feature of reality because of 1) the present moment can be objectively distinguished, 2) time has an objective direction, of earlier and later, and 3) there is something objectively dynamic about time.
                        From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 1.1)
                        A reaction: Price sets out to undermine all three of these claims, in implicit defence of a psychological view. I disagree with him.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
We must explain either the existence of a time direction, or our psychological sense of it
                        Full Idea: If the world comes equipped with a time orientation, where does it come from? If it doesn't, what explains our psychological feeling of a direction for time?
                        From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 3.5)
                        A reaction: The chances of 'explaining' either one look slim to me. That is, the fact would explain our experience, but the experience without the fact looks ridiculous, and I cannot conceive of any time-free entity which could explain the fact.