Ideas from 'Philebus' by Plato [353 BCE], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Complete Works' by Plato (ed/tr Cooper,John M.) [Hackett 1997,0-87220-349-2]].

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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one
                        Full Idea: Someone first distinguishes a person's limbs and parts and asks your agreement that all the parts are identical with that unity, then ridicules you that you have to admit one is many, and indefinitely many, and again that the many are only only one thing.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e)
                        A reaction: This is a passing aporia, but actually seems to approach the central mystery of the metaphysics of identity. A thing can't be a 'unity' if there are not things to unify? So what sorts of 'unification' are there?
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one
                        Full Idea: It will be ridiculous if our student knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself, but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, used in housebuilding.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 62a)
                        A reaction: This is the equivalent of being able to recite numbers, but not to count objects. It also resembles Molyneux's question (to Locke), of whether recognition by one sense entails recognition by others. Nice (and a bit anti-platonist!).
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them
                        Full Idea: The arithmetic of the many computes sums of unequal units, such as two armies, or two herds, ..but philosopher's arithmetic computes when it is guaranteed that none of those infinitely many units differed in the least from any of the others.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 56d)
                        A reaction: But of course 'the many' are ironing out the differences too, when they say there are 'three armies'. Shocking snob, Plato. Even philosophers are interested in the difference between three armies and three platoons.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all
                        Full Idea: Any blend [mixture] which does not have measure or the nature of proportion in any way whatsoever, of necessity destroys both its ingredients and, primarily, itself. It is truly no blend at all, but a kind of unblended disaster.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e)
                        A reaction: Obviously there can be chaotic mixtures, but I guess Plato is picking out mixtures about which we can say something
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed
                        Full Idea: Any kind of mixture that does not ...possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending in such cases but really an unconnected medley, and ruin what contains it.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64d)
                        A reaction: My guess is that Plato is thinking of the decay of living things when they die, losing the proportions of psuché, and then applying this to the unity of inanimate objects as well. One might compare Leibniz's monads.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself?
                        Full Idea: If man is one, and the good is one, how are they supposed to exist? Do they stay the same even though they are found in many things at the same time, and are they then entirely separated from themselves, which seems most impossible of all?
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15a)
                        A reaction: Presumably Plato anguishes over this because he thinks Forms are self-predicating (the Good is good). Big mistake. The Good fathers good particulars which resemble itself, but are diluted?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it
                        Full Idea: It is through discourse that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15d)
                        A reaction: This is not scepticism about wholes on Plato's part, but a reminder of an obvious fact, that in thought we can break the world up and put it back together again. It is a touchstone of the debate, though.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one
                        Full Idea: Someone can theoretically divide an object into constituent parts, concede that they are one object, and then claim that therefore the one is many and the many are one.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e)
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant?
                        Full Idea: Could we attribute certainty to studying aspects of the world, such as how it arose, or acts, or is acted upon, when none of them ever was or will be constant? Of course not.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 59b)
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty
                        Full Idea: Moderation and proportion seem, in effect, to be beauty and excellence. So now this property we're looking for, goodness, has taken refuge in beauty.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient
                        Full Idea: Both intellect and pleasure are completely absolved of being the good itself, since they both lack independence, that is, sufficiency and perfection.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a)
                        A reaction: This seems to be Plato disagreeing with Socrates, who sees reason and intellect as central to morality. Presumable he means that the good should be a primitive. Why is pleasure not sufficient?
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth
                        Full Idea: If we are unable to net the good in a single concept, three must capture it: namely, beauty, proportion and truth.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 65a)
                        A reaction: Very interesting. More illuminating than the discussion of the Good in 'Republic'. Is a handsome and honest murderer good? Is beauty part of the nature of the good, or a hallmark of it?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure
                        Full Idea: Good is supreme, followed by beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pure pleasure, then mixed pleasure.
                        From: report of Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) by PG - Db (ideas)
                        A reaction: He tells us that pure pleasures are simple pleasures. Epicurus presumably read this. No mention of truth, unless that is part of reason. Why does he value beauty so highly?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false
                        Full Idea: Living beings experience pleasures and pains which seem, and indeed are, false.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 42c)
                        A reaction: The idea that there are 'authentic' pleasures and pains needs some investigation. Misguided anger is a false pain? Vanity is a false pleasure?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain
                        Full Idea: A tiny little pleasure is, if uncontaminated by pain, always more pleasant, truer and finer than a large amount.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 53b)
                        A reaction: More Platonic puritanism. Is a complete absence of pleasure the highest pleasure of all? I don't think I understand 'truer'. Why would a pleasure be false because it is intense?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them
                        Full Idea: My contention is that reason, intellect, memory - along with correct belief and true calculation - are far better than pleasure for all creatures capable of attaining them.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 11b)
                        A reaction: Why? Is it better to understand deeply, or to act well? Can we just say there is objective good and subjective good, and they have little in common? Depressed heroes.
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that
                        Full Idea: Neither pleasure nor intellect comprises the good. If it did it would have to be sufficient and perfect.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 22b)
                        A reaction: Seems sensible. I can't make sense of any vision of the good which consists of suppressing some aspect of human nature. (Hm. Our capacity for violence?)
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure?
                        Full Idea: Try thinking about the life of pleasure without reason, and the life of reason without pleasure.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 20e)
                        A reaction: I suspect that we see the two as more deeply entangled that Plato did. It would be hard to motivate reasoning if we didn't enjoy it. Pleasure without reason sound dire.
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good
                        Full Idea: The pleasantness of pleasure is not in dispute, but where we say the majority of pleasures are bad, though some are good, you are attributing goodness to all of them.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 13b)
                        A reaction: Bentham's plausible view is that the feeling of pleasure is always good, and the badness is in some other aspect of the event. Compare sadistic fantasy with sadistic action.
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain
                        Full Idea: It is unlikely that the gods feel pleasure or the opposite.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 33b)
                        A reaction: Compare Idea 383.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony
                        Full Idea: When harmony is being restored, and the natural state of harmony is approached, then pleasure arises.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 31d)
                        A reaction: The supreme value of harmony was important to Plato, but most of us are less convinced, I suspect. The way to achieve harmony is to avoid anything stressful.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one
                        Full Idea: Intensity of pleasure and pain is to be found not in a good state of body and soul, but in a worthless one.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 45e)
                        A reaction: This just seems to be Plato's puritanism. How can you criticise someone for experience genuine intense pain? Experiencing intense pleasure is no crime, but pursuit of it might be.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish
                        Full Idea: A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is not the life of a human being, but the life of a jellyfish.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21c)
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous
                        Full Idea: A hedonist must say that someone who happens to be feeling pain rather than pleasure is, as long as the pain lasts, a bad man, even if he is the most virtuous man in the world.
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 55b)
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything?
                        Full Idea: Would you, Protarchus, gladly live your whole life experiencing only the greatest pleasure? Would you think you were still lacking anything?
                        From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21a)
                        A reaction: the pleasure machine problem