Ideas from 'works' by Daniel Dennett [1985], by Theme Structure

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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs
                        Full Idea: If something has beliefs only if something else is disposed to "treat it" (i.e. think of it) as though it does, then we seem at least to have an infinite regress of appeals to believers.
                        From: comment on Daniel Dennett (works [1985]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.2.1
                        A reaction: This sounds like a serious difficulty for behaviourists, but is not insurmountable. We need a community of interlocking behaviours, with a particular pattern of behaviour being labelled (for instrumental convenience) as 'beliefs'.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology
                        Full Idea: Folk psychology is indispensable for driving a car, which would be terrifying if we didn't assume there were psychologically normal people behind the wheels.
                        From: Daniel Dennett (works [1985]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind p.133 n35
                        A reaction: Nice example. If someone is approaching you from the front on your side of the road, should you assume that they are 'psychologically normal'? Does psychology imply behaviour, or vice versa?