Ideas from 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' by Willard Quine [1953], by Theme Structure

[found in 'From a Logical Point of View' by Quine,Willard [Harper and Row 1963,0-06-130566-9]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems

1627	Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

1623	Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated

9204	Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K]

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism

17738

Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems

19492

Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

1628	If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

10929

Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

12188

Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [McFetridge]

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

15090

Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Shoemaker]

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic

9383	Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian]

12424

Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Kitcher]

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori

9337	Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Horwich]

9338	Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich]

9340	Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich]

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism

1620	Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts

1629	Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

19488

The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Yablo]

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism

1625	Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

1626	It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy

7317	'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Miller,A]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings

1621	Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions

9371	Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique

9366	Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Boghossian]

14473

Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Thomasson]

7321	The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A]

8803	Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson]

17737

The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Jenkins]

1624	If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity

1622	Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?