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| 22733 | Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature |
| Full Idea: Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.58 | |||
| A reaction: Plato and Aristotle also distinguished their esoteric from their exoteric writings, but this is an indication that thei popular works may always have presented safer doctrines. |
| 13291 | Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom |
| Full Idea: To win true freedom you must be a slave to philosophy. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 008 | |||
| A reaction: A lovely idea. It is one thing to free the body, or to free one's social situation, but the challenge to 'free your mind' is either romantic nonsense or totally baffling, apart from the suggestion offered here. Reason is freedom. Very Kantian. |
| 22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is an activity which secures the happy life by arguments and discussions. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Ethicists (one book) VI.169 | |||
| A reaction: Presumably this aims at the happiness of the participant. Universal happiness would need to be much more political. If this is your aim then you can't just follow the winds of the argument, but must channel it towards happiness. No nasty truths? |
| 14523 | We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture |
| Full Idea: I congratulate you, sir, because you have come to philosophy free of any taint of culture. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |||
| A reaction: [source: Athenaeus, 'Deipnosophists' 13 588b] No one nowadays thinks such an aspiration remotely possible, not least because the culture is embedded in your native language, but I find the idea very appealing. |
| 22240 | The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections |
| Full Idea: Just as there is no benefit to medicine if it does not heal the sicknesses [nosos] of bodies, so too there is none to philosophy unless it expels that affections of the soul. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], fr 221), quoted by James Allen - Soul's Virtue and the Health of the Body p.78 | |||
| A reaction: This sounds rather Buddhist, if the only route to happiness is to suppress the emotions. Epicurus probably refers to the more extreme desires, which only lead to harm. Galen quotes Chrysippus as endorsing this idea (see footnote 5). |
| 1484 | We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts |
| Full Idea: We should make no assertion about the whole when our contact is with the parts. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109e |
| 2670 | Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic |
| Full Idea: Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.30.97 |
| 21668 | Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic |
| Full Idea: Epicurus said that not every proposition is either true or false. ...Epicurus was afraid that if he admits that every proposition is true or false he will also have to admit that all events are caused by fate (if they are so from all eternity). | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.21 | |||
| A reaction: Epicurus proposed his 'swerve' in the movements of atoms to avoid this fatalism. Epicurus is agreeing with Aristotle, who did not accept excluded middle for a future contingent sea-fight. |
| 21676 | Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true |
| Full Idea: Epicureans make the impudent assertion that disjunctions consisting of contrary propositions are true, but that the statements contained in the propositions are neither of them true. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 16.36 | |||
| A reaction: Is that 'it is definitely one or the other, but we haven't a clue which one'? Seems to fit speculations about Goldbach's Conjecture. It doesn't sound terribly impudent to me. Or is it the crazy 'It's definitely one of them, but it's neither of them'? |
| 1823 | We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them |
| Full Idea: We could not seek for anything if we had not some notion of it. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21 |
| 1824 | To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is |
| Full Idea: We could not give names to things, if we had not a preliminary notion of what the things were. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21 |
| 5949 | Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies |
| Full Idea: Epicurus says that colours are not intrinsic to bodies but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye, which implies that body is no more colourless than coloured. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], Fr 30) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1110 | |||
| A reaction: This seems to me such a self-evident truth that I am puzzled as to why anyone would claim that colours are real features of bodies. Epicurus points out that entering a dark room we see no colour, but then colour appears after a while. |
| 1821 | Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common |
| Full Idea: Sensation is out of reach of control, because one sensation cannot judge another which resembles itself, as they have equal value, and different sensations have different objects. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 | |||
| A reaction: Scepticism about the possibility of purely empirical knowledge; an interesting comment on the question of whether perceptions contain any intrinsic knowledge. |
| 1820 | The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions |
| Full Idea: The criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions, and the passions. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 |
| 1822 | Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them |
| Full Idea: Reason cannot judge the senses, because it is based on them. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 |
| 4549 | Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values |
| Full Idea: Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge in order to retain moral (or hedonistic) values as the highest values. | |||
| From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Will to Power (notebooks) §578 | |||
| A reaction: The history of philosophy suggests that this dichotomy is unnecessary. Dogmatist place a high value on multitudes of things. |
| 2668 | Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed |
| Full Idea: Epicurus says that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.25.79 |
| 1487 | When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears |
| Full Idea: On entering a dark room we see no colour, but do so after waiting a short time. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1110d |
| 1482 | If two people disagree over taste, who is right? |
| Full Idea: If one person says the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet? | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b |
| 1483 | Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others |
| Full Idea: In the very same bath some treat the water as too hot, others as too cold. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b |
| 14526 | The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body |
| Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |||
| A reaction: [source Aetius 4.4.6] |
| 6035 | Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception |
| Full Idea: Epicurus says the soul is a blend of fiery stuff (for bodily warmth), airy stuff (rest), breath (motion), and a nameless stuff (sense-perception). | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.3.11 | |||
| A reaction: Obviously Epicurus thought the four stuffs were different combinations of atoms, rather than being elements. Is there no stuff which gives reason? Reason must reduce to motion, presumably. |
| 6018 | Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian |
| Full Idea: By posing the problem of determinism, Epicurus became arguably the first philosopher to recognise the philosophical centrality of what we call the Free Will Question. His strongly libertarian approach is strongly contrasted with Stoic determinism. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary | |||
| A reaction: Epicurus introduced the rather dubious 'swerve' of the atoms to make room for free will. It seems to me more consistent to stick with the determinism of Democritus. Zeno became a determinist in reaction to Epicurus. |
| 20922 | Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms |
| Full Idea: There is a free motion in the atoms, which Democritus did not discover, but which Epicurus brought to light, and which consists in a swerve, as he demonstrated on the basis of what is seen to be the case? | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - Wall inscription 54.II-III | |||
| A reaction: I presume the last bit means that we see that we have freedom of choice, and infer the swerve in the atoms as the only possible explanation. The worry for libertarians is, of course, who is in charge of the swerve. |
| 14516 | There is no necessity to live with necessity |
| Full Idea: Necessity is a bad thing, but there is no necessity to live with necessity. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], 9) |
| 1909 | How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? |
| Full Idea: If Epicurus makes the end consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure, or judgement of the good. | |||
| From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism III.187 | |||
| A reaction: This is a nice statement of the mind-body problem. Ontologically, physics still seems to present reality as a 'heap of particles', which gives no basis for the emergence of anything as strange as consciousness. But then magnetism is pretty strange. |
| 7814 | It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics |
| Full Idea: Epicurus was responsible for the innovatory recognition that the question of the will's freedom is central to ethics. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |||
| A reaction: Compare Ideas 7672 and 6018. Obviously ethical action needs freedom, but the idea of a 'free will' is quite different. It is a fiction, created to give some sort of arrogant ultimate responsibility to our actions, like God. |
| 3562 | Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure |
| Full Idea: I spit on the fine and those who emptily admire it, when it doesn't make any pleasure. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16 | |||
| A reaction: in Athenaeus |
| 1840 | Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals |
| Full Idea: Pleasure is the chief good, because all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended by pain by their natural instinct, without the employment of reason. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29 | |||
| A reaction: The highest pleasure of predators is likely to be the killing of weaker animals. What all animals do isn't much of a criterion for the natural chief good. They also breathe. |
| 3557 | The end for Epicurus is static pleasure |
| Full Idea: Epicurus identifies our final end with what he calls tranquillity or 'ataraxia', which is static pleasure. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.7 |
| 1839 | Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future |
| Full Idea: The pains of the soul are worst, for the flesh is only sensible of present affliction, but the soul feels the past, present and future. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29 | |||
| A reaction: I don't think feeling extended across time is very relevant. What matters is that pains of the soul usually endure far longer than physical suffering. |
| 1842 | Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected |
| Full Idea: If every pleasure lasted long, and affected the whole body, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.08 | |||
| A reaction: This seems to miss out on intensity, which is of great importance to most pleasure seekers. Also it is a pleasure to be alive, which is lifelong, but we barely notice it. |
| 1845 | Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts |
| Full Idea: Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.35 |
| 1841 | We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake |
| Full Idea: We choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.30 |
| 1829 | A wise man would be happy even under torture |
| Full Idea: Even if the wise man were put to the torture, he would still be happy. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26 |
| 1843 | Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life |
| Full Idea: Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.28 |
| 1831 | Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind |
| Full Idea: Even though he lose his eyes, a wise man should still partake of life. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26 |
| 12044 | Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts |
| Full Idea: Epicurus alone among the ancient schools denies that in nature we find any teleological explanations. Nothing in nature is for anything, neither the world as a whole nor anything in it. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction | |||
| A reaction: This may explain the controversial position that epicureanism held in the seventeenth century, as well as its incipient atheism. |
| 20907 | Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight |
| Full Idea: Democritus said that the properties of the atoms are in number two, magnitude and shape, but Epicurus added to these a third one, weight. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.3.18 | |||
| A reaction: The addition of Epicurus seems very sensible, and an odd omission by Democritus. He seems to think that atoms have a uniform density, so that volume indicates weight. |
| 21669 | Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused |
| Full Idea: The swerve of Epicurus takes place without a cause; it does not take place in consequence of being struck by another atom, since how can that take place if they are indivisible bodies travelling perpendicularly in straight lines by the force of gravity? | |||
| From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.22 | |||
| A reaction: The swerve is the most ad hoc proposal in the history of theoretical physics. This is interesting for spelling out that the travel in vertical parallels. What's that all about, then? |
| 21680 | What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? |
| Full Idea: What fresh cause exists in nature to make the atom swerve (or do the atoms cast lots among them which is to swerve and which not?), or to serve as the reason for making a very small swerve and not a large one, or one swerve, and not two or three swerves? | |||
| From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 20.46 | |||
| A reaction: This is an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which seems to be the main ground for rejecting the swerve. The only reason to accept the swerve is reluctance to accept determinism or fatalism. |
| 14525 | Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things |
| Full Idea: Stoics posited that time is an incorporeal which is conceived of all by itself, while Epicurus thinks that it is an accident of certain things, ...and he called in a property of properties. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |||
| A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.219-227] |
| 2637 | For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal |
| Full Idea: For Epicureans the gods are made of atoms, so in that case they are not eternal. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.68 |
| 2633 | Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds |
| Full Idea: Epicurus alone saw that gods must exist because nature herself has imprinted an idea of them in the minds of all mankind. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.43 |
| 2639 | Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians |
| Full Idea: Some believe that Epicurus gave lip-service only to the gods, so as not to offend the Athenians, but in fact did not believe in them. | |||
| From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.84 |
| 14527 | If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer |
| Full Idea: If god acted in accordance with the prayers of men, all men would rather quickly be destroyed, since they constantly pray for many sufferings to befall each other. | |||
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |||
| A reaction: [source Maximus the Abbott 'Gnom.' 14] |